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ARGUMENT
I. THE DEFINITION CLAUSE IN THE CANAL POLICY OF
INSURANCE IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
Regal alleges that the relevant insuring and/or definition clauses of the Canal
policy are "ambiguous." Regal's conclusory claim that the policy provisions are
"ambiguous" is without basis. The "ambiguity" argument was not made at the trial
court level. Canal respectfully submits that this Court can review the relevant Personal
Injury Protection ("PIP") sections of the Canal policy and make a determination based
on the policy language and Utah law whether or not PIP coverage applies to the KC
Trucking semi-trailer under the circumstances of the accident. Canal issued a policy of
insurance to KC Trucking. The KC Trucking semi-trailer was borrowed by Donald
Boyet ("Boyet") and was being pulled by and was attached to a semi-tractor owned by
Boyet and operated by Kelly J. Devey ("Devey"). This semi-tractor trailer unit
collided with Christina Chatwin, a pedestrian.
The plain language of the policy defines "eligible injured person," includes:
A pedestrian if the accident involves the use of an insured
motor vehicle. (Emphasis added).
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The plain language of the definition of "insured motor vehicle," is defined as a
motor vehicle with respect to which:
(a)
The bodily injury liability insurance of the policy
applies and for which a specific premium is charged and
(b) The named insured is required to maintain security
under the provisions of Title 31A Utah Code Annotated . . .
(Emphasis added).
The language contained in § 31A-22-302(2) specifically exempts semi-trailers
from the security requirements of § 41-12a-301. When the KC Trucking trailer is
attached to the tractor insured by another company, it becomes part of that "motor
vehicle" and the tractors insurers have responsibility for the entire vehicle. (Utah Code
Annotated § 41-12a-103(4)). When the KC Trucking trailer is not attached to the KC
Trucking tractor, the trailer, in and of itself, is not covered under the PIP provision of
the Canal policy.
This Court can and should review the relevant policy provisions and statutory
provisions without the need to resort to Regal's claim of "ambiguity."
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II. REGAL'S CLAIM IS SUBJECT TO
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
In Regal's Appellee Brief, Regal continues to argue and assert the fiction that
Christina Chatwin, the injured pedestrian, has made a claim for PIP benefits against
Canal and that Canal reftised to pay such PIP benefits to Christina Chatwin. Regal then
claims, based upon this fictional argument, that Regal's so-called "subrogation" rights
in attempting to enforce Christina Chatwin's rights, somehow negate the mandatory
arbitration provisions of § 31A-22-310(6)(b).
Regal makes much of the argument that if Canal's policy does provide PIP
coverage, then the Canal policy would be "primary" and Regal's policy only
"secondary." However, even a "primary" insurer cannot pay a claim that is never
made. Canal wishes to emphasize the fact that at no time has Christina Chatwin ever
made a claim against Canal or otherwise contacted Canal in connection with her PIP
benefits nor has Christina Chatwin made any other claim at any time to this day against
Canal Insurance Company. Regal, and not Chatwin, contacted Canal long after the
accident and after it had already paid its PIP limits to its insured, Chatwin, and
demanded that Canal reimburse Regal for PIP benefits paid to its insured.
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Regal would now have this Court accept and believe the fiction that when Regal
contacted Canal demanding reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to Chatwin, that under
principles of subrogation, it was really Chatwin making the request and as such,
Canal's denial of Regal's request for PIP reimbursement constitutes a direct denial by
Canal of PIP benefits to Chatwin. Regal would further have the Court accept the
pretension that since Canal did not reimburse Regal PIP benefits previously paid to
Chatwin within 30 days of Regal's demand, that Canal must also pay interest and
attorneys fees pursuant to the provisions of § 31A-22-310(5).
Canal respectfully requests that this Court should not accept Regal's fiction
under the guise of "subrogation" but look at the facts as they actually took place.
Specifically, Chatwin at no time has made application for or a claim for PIP benefits to
Canal. Instead, Chatwin made a claim for PIP benefits to Regal. Regal paid those
benefits and subsequently sought reimbursement of PIP benefits from Canal. Canal
declined to reimburse Regal for PIP benefits paid to Regal's insured, Chatwin, based
on Canal's understanding of its policy provisions and further based upon Canal's
reliance on Utah law, which requires that a request for reimbursement of PIP benefits
from one insurance carrier to another is subject to mandatory arbitration.
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Canal respectfully submits that there is no reason to pretend that Christina
Chatwin, after sustaining an injury in the accident of November 11, 1995, made
application to PIP benefits to Canal. She did not. There is no reason to pretend that
Canal refused to pay Christina Chatwin PIP benefits within 30 days of her application
and that Canal should therefore be liable for interest and attorneys fees. This did not
happen. There is no reason to pretend that Regal's request for reimbursement of PIP
benefits from Canal is really just a "coverage question" and therefore not a
reimbursement claim subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of § 31A-22310(6)(b).
Should these fictions asserted by Regal be accepted by this Court, the provisions
of § 31A-22-310(6)(b) would become virtually meaningless. Any insurance carrier
having paid PIP benefits to its insured, which carrier did not want to go to the trouble
of mandatory arbitration, could claim that it was merely exercising its "subrogation"
rights and, as Regal did herein, file a direct suit against an adverse insurance carrier
claiming that since it is exercising its "subrogation rights," it need not comply with the
mandatory arbitration provisions under Utah law.
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Regal paid $3,000.00 in PIP benefits to its insured, Christina Chatwin.
Subsequently, Regal requested reimbursement of those PIP benefits from Canal
Insurance Company, the insurer of the semi-trailer (apparently Regal has never
demanded reimbursement of PIP benefits from the insurers or owners of the semitractor involved in the accident). Regal may well be entitled to reimbursement of PIP
benefits from either the insurers of the tractor or Canal, the insurers of the trailer.
However, the appropriate forum to determine whether or not Regal is entitled to
reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to its insured, is arbitration.
Canal has never received an application for PIP benefits from Christina Chatwin.
Chatwin has never contacted Canal and has never made a claim for PIP benefits or any
other insurance benefits from Canal at any time. Canal has never denied PIP benefits
to Chatwin and in fact has had no contact with Chatwin whatsoever. Chatwin was paid
PIP benefits within 30 days of her application, by Regal. There is no legal or factual
basis for the trial court's awarding prejudgment interest and attorneys fees to Regal,
Chatwin's insurers, pursuant to the provisions of § 31A-22-310(5), which section was
intended to protect insureds such as Chatwin making PIP claims against an insurance
carrier from waiting an inordinate amount of time before those claims are processed
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and payments are made. This section was never intended to be used as a basis for a
windfall award of attorneys fees and prejudgment interest to one insurance carrier, in
this case Regal, seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits from another insurance carrier,
in this case Canal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding that the Canal policy of insurance provided PIP
coverage on the KC Trucking semi-trailer under circumstances involved in the accident
in question, specifically while the semi-trailer was borrowed by another entity and
attached to and being pulled by a tractor not insured by Canal and presumably insured
by another carrier. Canal's policy only intents that PIP coverage is provided to the
extent required by Title 31 A, which statute does not require PIP coverage on semitrailers.
Even if Canal's policy does provide PIP coverage, Christina Chatwin has never
at any time made application for PIP benefits to Canal. Chatwin requested PIP benefits
from her insurance carrier, Regal, Regal paid those benefits and subsequently requested
reimbursement from Canal. If reimbursement by Canal or any other insurance carrier
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is appropriate, then the proper forum to decide that issue is arbitration pursuant to §
31A-22-310(6).
Canal has never denied PIP benefits to Chatwin and the trial court erred in
awarding to Regal attorneys fees and prejudgment interest pursuant to § 31A-22-310(5).
Respectftdly submitted this

day of December, 2001.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

AHLER
r Appellant
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